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Regional Integration Through Dispute Settlement: 
The European Union Experience 
 
Ellen Vos
*
 
 
Abstract: 
 
Dispute settlement mechanisms have considerably advanced the European integration 
process. This paper aims to scrutinise the main legislative provisions and structure of the 
dispute settlement mechanisms in the European Union. It discusses the two different types of 
dispute settlement (judicial and alternative) as well as some mechanisms that have been 
designed to prevent disputes from arising. It is submitted that the current EU model of dispute 
settlement does not offer ideal solutions but could serve as a learning process for other 
integration processes such as the Andean Community and the recently created South 
American Community of Nations. 
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1. Introduction 
 
One of the vital components for the sustainability of the processes of regional integration is 
the legitimacy and effectiveness of the dispute settlement mechanisms.
1
 This paper therefore 
aims to scrutinise the main legislative provisions and structure of the dispute settlement 
mechanisms in the European Union, which, contrary to the experience with the Andean 
Community, have considerably advanced the European integration process.  
 
Within the European Union context, in particular the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has 
never grown tired of pushing towards more integration, to an ‘ever closer union between the 
peoples of Europe’. By means of its pro-active attitude in addressing disputes, the ECJ is 
therefore generally considered to be of pivotal importance for the European integration 
process. As one author commented:  
 
‘European legal integration, provoked by the European Court of Justice …and sustained by 
private litigants and national judges, has gradually but inexorably ‘transformed’ ... the European 
Community.
2
 
 
In its case law, the Court has not shied away from promoting a ‘certain idea of Europe’.
3
 It is 
a commonly held that the ECJ has followed a vigorous policy of legal integration, in 
particular in the first decades of the Community’s existence and that the Court has given flesh 
and substance to the ‘framework’ EC Treaty.
4
 The Court has so been very active in expanding 
Community competences and enhancing the effectiveness of Community law, whilst it also 
has actively promoted the integration of Community law into national legal systems.
5
 Already 
                                                 
1
 As was highlighted during the workshop ‘Specific Aspects of the Experiences of the European Union and 
the Andean Community’ which was held in Sao Paolo in October 2004. 
2
 A. Stone Sweet, The Judicial Construction of Europe (OUP, Oxford 2004), 1. 
3
 P. Pescatore, `The doctrine of direct effect: an infant disease of community law`, (1983) 8 EL Rev 155-177, 
157. 
4
 See P. Craig and G. de Búrca, EU Law, Text, Cases and Materials (OUP, Oxford 2003), 87. 
5
 See for recent reviews e.g. G. de Búrca, `The European Court of Justice and the Evolution of EU law`, in: 
T. Börzel and R. Cichowski (eds.), The State of the European Union, Law, Politics and Society (OUP, Oxford 
2003), 48-75; M. Dougan, National Remedies before the Court of Justice, (Hart Publishing, Oxford 2004); 
M.Claes, The National Courts’ Mandate in the European Constitution (Hart Publishing, Oxford 2005); G. De 
Búrca and J. H. H. Weiler (eds.), The European Court of Justice (OUP, Oxford 2001); A. Dashwood and A. 
Johnston (eds.), The Future of the Judicial System of the European Union (Hart Publishing, Oxford 2001); A. 
Arnull, The European Union and its Court of Justice (OUP, Oxford 1999); M. Maduro Poiares, We the Court 
 6 
at very early infant stage of the Community, the Court inferred from the Treaty objectives and 
the text of the provisions, that the Community was an autonomous legal order and that 
Community law had supremacy over any incompatible national law.
6
 One year earlier, the 
Court had already articulated the concept of direct effect of Community law.
7
 Importantly, the 
‘success-story’ of European integration can be partly attributed to this activist-attitude of the 
ECJ and its development of the principles of supremacy and direct effect.
8
 The importance 
attached to the Court in the study of Community law has made political scientists to comment 
that ‘legal scholars portray the Court as a hero who has greatly advanced the cause of 
integration’.
9
 Similarly, the ECJ has been depicted as the ‘European lawyer’s hobbyhorse’.
10
  
 
The functioning of this system should nevertheless by no means be considered in isolation as 
only relatively few cases are actually dealt with by courts. It is general knowledge that these 
procedures are costly and lengthy. For example, where at times it is difficult to enforce EU 
legislation other than by means of court actions, producers have indicated that they prefer to 
adapt their market strategy to the different regulatory requirements of the Member States 
rather than enforcing their rights, based on the principle of mutual recognition,
11
 through 
court proceedings.
12
 The European institutions have therefore developed various instruments 
for the prevention and amicable settlement of problems.
13
 For example, as regards the 
problems producers may face with the import of their products in a Member State, an 
administrative network has been set up with the aim of solving problems that have arisen 
                                                                                                                                                        
(Hart Publishing, Oxford 1998), R. Dehousse, The European Court of Justice (Macmillan, Basingstoke 1998), 
H. Rasmussen, The European Court of Justice, (Gadjura, Copenhagen 1998), A. M. Slaughter, A. Stone Sweet 
and J. H. H. Weiler (eds.), The European Court and National Courts (Hart Publishing, Oxford 1998). 
6
 Case 6/64 Flaminio Costa v E.N.E.L. [1964] ECR 614, Case 11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft 
mbH v Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel [1970] ECR 1125, Case 106/77 Amministrazione 
delle Finanze dello Stato v Simmenthal SpA [1977] ECR 629. 
7
 Case 26/62, NV Algemene Transport- en Expeditie Onderneming van Gend & Loos v Netherlands Inland 
Revenue Administration [1962] ECR 1. 
8
 Discussion of the doctrine of direct effect and supremacy falls outside of the scope of this article. See for a 
discussion on this issue, e.g. Craig and de Búrca, supra note 4, Chapters 5 and 7. See also the article by E. Best 
in this volume. 
9
 K. Alter and S. Meunier-Aitsahalia, `Judicial politics in the European Community`, (1994) 26 
Comparative Political Studies, 535-561, 535-6. 
10
 T. Koopmans, `The future of the Court of Justice of the European Communities` (1991) 11 YBEL, 15. 
11
 See about these problems, the 1999 Communication  from the Commission to the European Parliament 
and the Council, COM(1999)299 final: ‘Mutual recognition in the context of the follow-up to the Action Plan for 
the Single Market’ and the Commission’s interpretative communication on facilitating the access of products to 
the markets of other Member States: the practical application of mutual recognition, OJ 2003, C 265/2.  
12
 See e.g. J. Pelkmans, L. Di Mauro, and E. Vos, ‘Reforming Product Regulation in the EU: a Painstaking, 
Iterative Two-level Game’, in: G. Galli and J. Pelkmans (eds.), Regulatory Reform for the Better Functioning of 
Markets (Edward Elgar, Northampton 2000), 238-291. 
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between a producer and a Member State.
14
 Moreover the institutions have developed various 
mechanisms to prevent disputes from arising.  
 
For the purpose of this article, the manner in which the European Union deals with disputes is 
thus roughly divided in two: judicial dispute settlement and alternative dispute settlement. 
This contribution therefore discusses the two different types of dispute settlement (judicial 
and alternative) as well as some mechanisms that have been designed to prevent disputes from 
arising.  
 
2 Judicial Dispute Settlement Mechanism: the European 
Court System 
 
As set forth above, the ECJ is generally considered to be a key actor in the European 
integration process. In view of the variety of its tasks, the ECJ has been depicted in various 
manners. So it has been described as a ‘kangaroo’ court, where it acts in enforcement cases 
(Article 226 cases), as the ECJ has closely followed the opinion of the Commission.
15
 
Moreover the ECJ is viewed as a ‘forum for inter-institutional debate’, where it has 
jurisdiction to review Community acts or inaction of the Community institutions, brought 
both by Member States and Community institutions (Articles 230 and 232 EC) and as a 
‘regulatory complaint board’ where it can hear cases brought by individuals against 
Community acts or inaction of the institutions (Articles 230 and 232 EC). The ECJ acts as a 
constitutional court where it needs to guard the objectives and rules of law laid down in the 
Treaties and plays an essential role in preserving the balance between the Community and the 
Member States.
16
 The ECJ thus decides on the legality of Community secondary legislation, 
the preservation of the institutional balance, the demarcation of Community and national 
                                                                                                                                                        
13
 See in the context of the free movement of goods, Report from the Commission to the Council, the 
European Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee - Second biennial Report on the Application of 
the Principle of Mutual Recognition in the Single Market, COM (2002) 419 final.  
14
 The so-called SOLVIT mechanism. See section 3.4. 
15
 Schepel and Blankenburg thus argue that the ECJ looks like the baby kangaroo in the pouch of the 
mother, as it has to follow wherever the Commission goes, H. Schepel and E. Blankenburg, `Mobilising the 
European Court of Justice`, in de Búrca and Weiler, supra note 5, 18.  
16
 See e.g. F. Jacobs, `Is the Court of Justice of the European Communities a Constitutional Court?` in: D. 
Curtin and D. O’Keeffe (eds.), Constitutional Adjudication in European Community and National Law 
(Butterworths, Dublin 1992), 32 and J. Komárek, `Federal Elements in the Community Judicial System: 
Building Coherence in The Community Legal Order`, (2005) 42 CML Rev, 9-34. 
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competence as well as the protection of fundamental rights. At the same time, the ECJ is 
sitting at the apex of the Community court system and as such needs to ensure the uniform 
application of Community law in the framework of a preliminary questions referred to it by 
national courts or upon appeal against a judgment of the Court of First Instance (CFI). 
 
In view of its continuously growing case law, over the years there has been much debate 
about the reform of the EU judicial system. It was however only after the negotiations during 
the Intergovernmental Conference in Nice that plans for reform took more serious form, 
which found their way into the Nice Treaty. The most important issues of reform that have 
been inserted into the EC Treaty are the possibility to create a third layer of specialised 
judicial panels under the CFI and the ECJ and the possibility for the CFI to exercise also 
jurisdiction in preliminary rulings.  
 
This section will thus analyse the European Union’s court dispute settlement mechanism. 
First it will examine the composition of the different bodies and their jurisdiction and the 
operational rules that govern these institutions. Second it will discuss the actual operation of 
the European courts and reveal some of its major problems. In addition, it will address the 
amendments which the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (‘the Constitution’) will 
introduce whenever it will enter into force. In conclusion, some of the challenges that the 
system will face in the future will be discussed.  
 
2.1 Structure and Composition  
 
The Community’s judicial branch has four different bodies or layers. The EC Treaty provides 
that the ECJ and the CFI, each within its jurisdiction, shall ensure that in the interpretation 
and application of the EC Treaty the law is observed.
17
 Subsequent to the Nice Treaty, the EC 
Treaty now provides that judicial panels may be attached to the CFI in order to exercise, in 
certain specific areas, the judicial competence laid down in the EC Treaty.
18
 Very recently the 
first judicial panel has been set up. It must be underlined that properly understood, also 
                                                 
17
 Article 220 EC Treaty. 
18
 The position of the ECJ is further regulated by the Statute of the ECJ (‘the Statute’), which is adopted by 
the member states. The ECJ also has Rules of Procedure adopted by itself.  
 9 
national courts are part of the Community’s judicial system and can therefore be viewed as 
the fourth type of Community Court. 
 
2.1.1 The European Court of Justice 
 
The ECJ is not a single unitary actor but is composed of 25 judges
19
 and 8 Advocates-
General.
20
 The judges are appointed by common accord of the governments of the Member 
States and hold their offices for a renewable term of six years. They are chosen from legal 
experts whose independence is beyond doubt and who possess the qualifications required for 
appointment to the highest judicial offices in their respective countries or who are of 
recognised competence. Every three years, (alternatively thirteen or twelve) judges are 
partially replaced.
21
 In accordance with their respective traditions, some Member States have 
appointed academics as judges, whilst others have nominated existing national judges or 
practising advocates as judges of the ECJ. Currently, after a long period of only male 
presence, there are now also some female judges in both the ECJ and the CFI. 
 
The Member States may not remove the judges. However, a judge may be dismissed if, in the 
unanimous opinion of the judges and advocates-general of the ECJ, he or she no longer fulfils 
the requisite conditions or meets the obligations arising from his or her office.
22
 Today, this 
provision has not been applied yet.
23
  
 
The judges are immune from legal proceedings. They may not hold any political or 
administrative office, and may only engage in any other occupation upon an exceptionally 
granted exemption.
24
 
 
The judges select the president of the Court from amongst themselves for a renewable term of 
three years after every partial replacement. Currently this is Mr Vassilios Skouris. The 
president directs the judicial business and the administration of the ECJ and he also presides 
                                                 
19
 Article 221 EC Treaty. 
20
 Article 222 EC Treaty. 
21
 Statute, Article 9. 
22
 Statute, Article 6. 
23
 T. C. Hartley, The Foundations of European Community Law (OUP, Oxford 2003), 55. 
24
 Article 223 EC Treaty and Statute, Articles 3-4. 
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at hearings and deliberations.
25
 The ECJ may sit as a full Court, in a Grand Chamber (13 
Judges) or in chambers of three or five Judges. The ECJ sits as a full Court in the very 
exceptional cases exhaustively provided for by the Treaty
26
 and where it considers that a case 
is of exceptional importance. The quorum for the full Court is 15. It sits in a Grand Chamber 
when a Member State or a Community institution that is a party to the proceedings so 
requests, or in particularly complex or important cases. Other cases are heard by a chamber of 
three or five Judges. After electing the president, the Court forms chambers of three or five 
judges and the judges elect the presidents of the chambers also for three years.  
 
Advocates-general are also elected to the ECJ for a term of six years. They must fulfil the 
same criteria for election as judges. They assist the ECJ in its task. They deliver -- in open 
court and with complete impartiality and independence -- opinions in all cases, save as 
otherwise decided by the Court where a case does not raise any new points of law.  
 
Advocates-general work independently of the judges. They examine the facts of the case, and 
investigate the case law relevant to the solution of the dispute. They prepare an opinion on the 
case, in which they examine the facts of the case as well as the applicable Community law. 
Theirs is the first reading and legal assessment of the case, which may serve as a starting point 
or reference, which the sitting court on several occasions accepts. The opinions of Advocates-
general however do not bind the judges when issuing the final judgment.  
 
The ECJ appoints its registrar for a term of six years. The registrar is responsible for the 
operation of the registry, into which all pleadings and supporting documents are to be entered. 
The registrar is further responsible for the acceptance, transmission and custody of these 
documents. The registrar also acts as head of the administrative infrastructure of the ECJ, 
which includes, among others, a library and research and documentation service and a large 
translation and interpretation service, supporting the use of all the official languages of the 
Community in the course of the ECJ’s work.  
 
                                                 
25
 Rules of Procedure, Article 8. 
26
 For example, where it must compulsorily retire the European Ombudsman or a Member of the European 
Commission who has failed to fulfil his obligations. 
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2.1.2 The Court of First Instance  
 
The creation of the CFI instituted a legal system based on two levels of jurisdiction: all cases 
heard at first instance by the CFI may be subject to appeal to the ECJ only on questions of 
law. The CFI is currently composed of 25 judges, one from each Member State. The judges 
are appointed for a renewable term of six years by common accord of the governments of the 
Member States.
27
 Contrary to the ECJ, the CFI does not have separate advocates-general, 
although any judge may be called upon to act as Advocate General.  
 
The CFI sits in chambers composed of three or five judges or, in certain cases, may be 
constituted by a single judge. It may also sit in a Grand Chamber or as a full court in 
particularly important cases. The CFI appoints its own registrar and lays down the rules 
applicable to its service. Further, the CFI establishes its Rules of Procedure in agreement with 
the ECJ.
28
 
 
2.1.3 Judicial Panels 
 
After the Nice Treaty, judicial panels may be created to hear and determine at first instance 
certain classes of action or proceeding brought in specific areas. The decision establishing a 
judicial panel shall lay down the rules on the organisation of the panel and the extent of the 
jurisdiction conferred upon it.
29
 
 
The members of the judicial panels shall be chosen from persons whose independence is 
beyond doubt and who possess the ability required for appointment to judicial office, 
therefore, the requirements are not as high as in the case of the European Courts. The judicial 
panels shall establish their Rules of Procedure in agreement with the ECJ.  
 
Decisions given by judicial panels may be subject to a right of appeal on points of law only 
or, when provided for in the decision establishing the panel, a right of appeal also on matters 
of fact, before the CFI.  
                                                 
27
 Article 224 EC Treaty. 
28
 Ibid.  
29
 Article 225a EC Treaty. 
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Further, unless the decision establishing the judicial panel provides otherwise, the provisions 
of the EC Treaty relating to the ECJ and the provisions of the Statute of the ECJ shall apply to 
the judicial panels. The first judicial panel that has been set up in 2004, is the Civil Service 
Tribunal.
30
 This new specialised court will consist of seven judges. 
 
2.2 Jurisdiction 
2.2.1 The ECJ and CFI: Mandate 
 
The ECJ and the CFI have duties under both the EC Treaty and the EU Treaty.
31
 Under the 
EC Treaty, they have to ensure that the law is observed in the interpretation and application of 
the Treaty.
32
 Their jurisdiction can be split up into hearing direct actions and preliminary 
rulings. In addition, the ECJ may also give opinions on, for example, the compatibility of 
international agreements to be concluded by the Community. Such opinions are advisory, but, 
nevertheless, have the legal effect that in case of a negative opinion certain amendments may 
be necessary to accommodate it.
33
 Whilst before the Treaty of Nice the jurisdiction of the two 
courts was determined according to the capacity of the applicant (institution, Member States 
or individuals), due to the caseload it has been decided after the Nice Treaty to allow more 
cases to be dealt with by the CFI, and a division has been made according to the subject-
matter of the disputes concerned.
34
 As a result of the new division of direct actions between 
the Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance, which came into effect on 1 June 2004, 
the CFI has acquired jurisdiction over direct actions for annulment and for failure to act 
brought by the Member States against: 
 
- acts of the Commission with the exception of those that concern enhanced cooperation 
under the EC Treaty; 
- decisions of the Council concerning State aid; 
                                                 
30
 Decision 2004/752/EC, Euratom of 2 November 2004 establishing the European Union Civil Service 
Tribunal, OJ 2004 L 333/7. 
31
 This distinction will be abolished by the entry into force of the Constitution.  
32
 Article 220 EC Treaty.  
33
 Hartley, supra note 23, 62. 
34
 Decision 2004/407/EC, Euratom amending Articles 51 and 54 of the Protocol on the Statute of the Court 
of Justice (OJ 2004 L 132/5, corrigendum at OJ 2004 L 194/3). 
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- acts of the Council adopted pursuant to a Council regulation concerning measures to 
protect trade; 
- acts of the Council by which it directly exercises implementing powers; 
- acts of the European Central Bank. 
 
The cases transferred to the CFI on this basis may be estimated quantitatively at 
approximately 5% of the cases before the Court of Justice.
35
 Hence, presently the CFI is 
competent to review acts on agriculture, state aid, competition, commercial policy, regional 
policy, social policy, institutional law, trade mark law, transport and staff regulations (until 
the Panel is set in place). The Nice Treaty allows also for the Council to transfer jurisdiction 
of preliminary ruling to the CFI.
36
 Some have welcomed this possibility,
37
 whilst others have 
received it with some concern.
38
 
 
A. Direct Actions 
 
Direct actions start at the European Courts and, accordingly, will end there as well.
39
 
Consequently, in case of the ECJ, there is no possibility for an appeal or any other kind of 
judicial remedy against its final and binding decision.
40
 Direct actions may include the 
following cases: 
 
i) Failure to fulfil obligations – infringement or enforcement procedures  
 
The ECJ is assigned competence to judge whether a Member State has failed to fulfil its 
obligations under Community law, brought by the European Commission. The power of the 
Commission to bring Member States before the court results from its ‘watchdog’ task, where 
it needs to ensure the proper application of the Treaty provisions and Community measures.
41
 
                                                 
35
 Annual report of the Court of Justice 2004, Luxemburg 2005. 
36
 Article 225 (3) EC Treaty. 
37
 J. H. H. Weiler, `Epilogue: The Judicial Apres-Nice`, in: de Búrca and Weiler (eds.), supra note 5, 215-
226. 
38
 See K. Lenaerts, `The role of the Court Of Justice, Court Of First Instance and Judicial Panels in the long 
term` at the CCBE – Colloquium on the Judicial Architecture of the European Union, see 
http://www.ccbe.org/colloquium_nov_2004/documents/1_s_lenaerts.doc 
39
 Hartley, supra note 23, 63. 
40
 See however the situation which will occur when the EU will adhere to the ECHR which is to occur when 
the Constitution will enter into force.  
41
 Article 211 EC Treaty, first indent. 
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Most enforcement proceedings concern the complaint by the Commission that Member States 
have failed to implement directives in time or correctly or have not implemented directives at 
all. This may also explain the development of the doctrine of direct effect by the ECJ as it 
reacts to the problem on non-implementation of directives at the national level.
42
  
 
The nature of the enforcement procedure is mixed. In part, it functions as a diplomatic means 
for friendly dispute settlement. As Snyder underlined:  
 
‘the main form of dispute settlement used by the Commission is negotiation, and litigation is 
simply a part, sometimes inevitable but nevertheless a minor part, of this process’.
43
 
 
The enforcement procedure also functions as a channel for individuals to complain to the 
Commission that Member States have infringed Community law, whilst it provides also for an 
‘objective’ law enforcement tool by the Commission.
44
 The procedure can be divided into 
four phases:
45
 a pre-contentious phase, an administrative phase in which the Commission 
formally notifies the Member State of the alleged infringement by means of a letter (letter of 
formal notice), followed by a reasoned opinion by the Commission, with as a final phase: 
litigation before the Court. It must be emphasised that the Commission is by no means 
obliged to bring a case before the Court. For political reasons it may consider it wise not to 
bring a specific Member State before the court. In addition, another Member State may also 
bring the matter before the ECJ.
46
  
 
If the Court finds that an obligation has not been fulfilled, the Member State must take the 
measures necessary to comply with the Court’s judgment that declares that their legislation is 
in breach of Community law. As over the years Member States continued to fail to comply 
with the judgments, the Treaty of Amsterdam inserted the possibility in the EC Treaty of a 
pecuniary penalty. This entails that if a Member State does not comply with the Court’s 
judgment, the ECJ may, upon the request of the Commission, impose a lump sum or penalty 
payment on the Member State concerned.
47
 After a slow start, the Commission now takes 
more seriously the possibility to bring a Member State before the ECJ for not having 
                                                 
42
 See S. Prechal, Directives in EC Law (OUP, Oxford 2005). 
43
 F. Snyder, `The Effectiveness of European Community law`, (1993) 56 Modern Law Review, 19-54, 30. 
44
 Craig and de Búrca, supra note 4, 398-399. 
45
 Article 226 EC Treaty.  
46
 Article 227 EC Treaty.  
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complied with an earlier judgment of the ECJ. Several proceedings were thus initiated, but to 
date only two judgments have been handed down by the ECJ, imposing a pecuniary penalty of 
20,000 euros daily on Greece and 624,150 euros on Spain for non-compliance.
48
 Other cases 
have been withdraw or are still pending.
49
  
 
ii) Action for annulment  
 
In an action for annulment, the applicant requests judicial review of a measure adopted by a 
Community institution (regulations, directives, and decisions). A Member State, the 
Community institutions or individuals to whom the measure contested is addressed or which 
is of direct and individual concern to them may bring an action for annulment before the 
European Courts.
50
 If the action is well founded, the European Courts will declare the act 
concerned to be void.
51
 
 
iii) Failure to act 
 
The European Courts may also review the legality of a failure to act by a Community 
institution. However, the action is admissible only if the institution concerned has first been 
called upon to act. The institution or institutions whose failure to act has been declared 
infringing, will be required to take the necessary measures to comply with the judgment of the 
European Courts. However, this procedure is without prejudice to the non-contractual liability 
of the Community
52
 (see point iv). 
 
iv) Non-contractual liability 
 
As a principle, in the case of non-contractual liability, the Community shall, in accordance 
with the general principles common to the laws of the Member States, make good any damage 
caused by its institutions or by its servants in the performance of their duties.
53
 In applications 
                                                                                                                                                        
47
 Article 228 EC Treaty.  
48
 Case C-387/97 Commission of the European Communities v Hellenic Republic [2000] ECR I-5047, 
concerning the disposal of toxic waste and C-278/01 Commission of the European Communities v Kingdom of 
Spain, not yet reported, concerning the quality of bathing water.  
49
 Case C-304/02 Commission of the European Communities v French Republic, pending.  
50
 Article 230 EC Treaty.  
51
 Article 231 EC Treaty.  
52
 Articles 232 and 233 EC Treaty.  
53
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for compensation for damages, based on non-contractual liability, the European Courts rule 
on the liability of the Community for damage caused to citizens and to undertakings by the 
above.
54
 
 
v) Appeals on points of law 
 
Appeals on points of law only may be brought before the ECJ against judgments given by the 
CFI. If the appeal is admissible and well founded, the ECJ sets aside the judgment of the CFI. 
Where the state of the proceedings so permits, the Court may itself decide the case. 
Otherwise, the Court must refer the case back to the CFI, which is bound by the decision 
given on appeal. 
 
vi) Staff cases 
 
The CFI has jurisdiction to hear staff cases, these are disputes between the Community and its 
officials and other servants. With the creation of the Civil Judicial Panel, these cases will be 
dealt with by the Panel.  
 
vii) Arbitration clauses 
 
The European Courts have jurisdiction to give judgment pursuant to any arbitration clause 
contained in a contract concluded by or on behalf of the Community, whether that contract be 
governed by public or private law.
55
 
 
viii) Special agreements 
 
The ECJ also has jurisdiction in any dispute between Member States which relates to the 
subject matter of this Treaty if the dispute is submitted to it under a special agreement 
between the parties.
56
 
 
                                                 
54
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55
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 Article 239 EC Treaty.  
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B. Preliminary References 
 
The preliminary reference procedure, laid down in Article 234 of the EC Treaty is one of the 
most original characteristics of the Community system. It has been referred to as the ‘jewel in 
the Crown’ of the ECJ’s jurisdiction,
57
 and as ‘one of the most remarkable and successful 
dimensions of the European legal order and European constitutionalism’.
58
 The ECJ appears 
to have been the first international court that has been given a jurisdiction of this kind, after 
which also the Benelux Court, the Andean Court of Justice and the EFTA Court have been 
granted a similar jurisdiction, the last having jurisdiction only to give advisory opinions.
59
 
The preliminary reference procedure gives expression to the multi-level character of the 
European integration system. Hence, while the European courts are, pursuant to the EC 
Treaty, conferred upon the task to ensure that the law is observed (see above), they are not the 
only judicial bodies within the European judicial system. National courts too form an integral 
part of the judicial architecture. They are also obliged to apply Community law, inasmuch as 
they retain jurisdiction to review the administrative implementation of Community law, for 
which the authorities of the Member States are essentially responsible. National courts are 
thus by their nature the first ‘guarantors’ of Community law.  
 
The preliminary ruling system has three functions: 1) it is to ensure a uniform application of 
Community law, 2) it is to facilitate the application of Community law by offering national 
courts a helping hand in resolving problems which may result from the application of 
Community law and 3) it is a means to protect the rights of citizens. Prior to the Nice Treaty, 
only the ECJ was granted the power to give preliminary rulings. Article 225 (3) of the EC 
Treaty now gives the Court of First Instance jurisdiction to hear and determine questions 
referred for a preliminary ruling under Article 234 in specific areas laid down by the Statute 
of the Court of Justice. Whenever the CFI considers that a case raises issues of principle that 
may affect the unity or consistency of EC law, it may refer the case to the ECJ. The decision 
by the CFI may exceptionally be reviewed by the ECJ, in cases where there is a serious risk 
that the unity or consistency of EC law will be affected. It must be stressed that the reference 
procedure sees to the relation between the national and European courts. Individuals do not 
have a right of appeal to the ECJ. 
                                                 
57
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59
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Article 234 reads as follows: 
 
The Court of Justice shall have jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings concerning: 
 
(a) the interpretation of this Treaty;  
(b)the validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions of the Community and of the ECB;  
(c)the interpretation of the statutes of bodies established by an act of the Council, where those 
statutes so provide. 
Where such a question is raised before any court or tribunal of a Member State, that court or 
tribunal may, if it considers that a decision on the question is necessary to enable it to give 
judgment, request the Court of Justice to give a ruling thereon.  
Where any such question is raised in a case pending before a court or tribunal of a Member 
State, against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law, that court or 
tribunal shall bring the matter before the Court of Justice. 
 
It follows that the ECJ has jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings concerning: (i) the 
interpretation of the EC Treaty; (ii) the validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions of 
the Community and of the ECB; and (iii) the interpretation of the statutes of bodies 
established by an act of the Council, where those statutes so provide.
60
 Questions of fact and 
of national law may not be referred. The courts are also not allowed to apply the law to a 
particular case, although it is often admittedly difficult to define the exact borderline between 
interpretation and application.  
 
To ensure the effective and uniform application of Community legislation and to prevent 
divergent interpretations, national courts may, where the interpretation of Community law is 
concerned, refer questions to the ECJ. However, national courts acting at the last instance 
must refer to the ECJ in the above case. They are exempted from this obligation in three 
cases: i) whenever they decide that the question is not relevant to solve the dispute at stake, ii) 
whenever they find that the question has already been resolved in a similar case or that it is 
consistent case law (acte éclaré) or iii) that the provision in question is ‘clear’ and that it does 
not require any interpretation (acte clair). The first case concerns situations where the 
national court is of the opinion that the case before it, although prima facie would concern 
                                                 
60
 Article 234 EC Treaty.  
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Community law, can be solved without a reference to that. This is so because Community law 
in no way affects the outcome of the case. The second case can be considered as more 
complex and has given rise to certain debates.
61
 The preliminary ruling system originally was 
described as horizontal and bilateral. However, by stating that national courts were under no 
further obligation to refer a question on Community law to the ECJ where ‘previous decisions 
of the Court have already dealt with the point of law in question’,
62
 the ECJ has clearly 
transformed this relationship into a vertical and multilateral one.
63
 Therefore, national courts 
no longer have to immediately refer a question on the interpretation of Community law to the 
European courts; rather, first they have to check whether there is a decision on the point of 
law in question. The last case deals with situations where the interpretation of Community 
law raises no doubts as to its proper meaning. However, the ECJ gives a caveat in this regard: 
 
‘the existence of such a possibility must be assessed on the basis of the characteristic feature of 
Community law and the particular difficulties to which its interpretation gives rise’.
64
  
 
Such characteristics and features may include the fact that Community law is drafted in 
several languages, has a specific terminology, and that it should be interpreted in a 
teleological way.  
 
Hence, as opposed to direct actions, preliminary reference procedures form a part of a 
national court’s procedure. The main dispute starts before a national court and, after obtaining 
the answers to the question(s) submitted for a preliminary ruling, the national court will rule 
on the merits of the case.  
 
The ECJ’s ruling is binding on the national court which referred the preliminary question. If 
the same issue arises again in a later case, the national court may apply the ruling again but it 
is not precluded from making a new reference. It is generally considered that not only the 
referring court but all courts are bound by the ruling unless it is overruled in a later judgment. 
The national courts should then either apply the ruling or make a new reference.
65
 
 
                                                 
61
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According to the division of tasks between the national court and the ECJ, it is for the former 
to determine the facts underlying the basic dispute and so to indicate the applicable rules of 
law and to assess the relevance of the questions which it refers to the Court. And, after the 
ECJ has answered the question, it is again for the national court to apply Community law in 
the way it was interpreted in the case before it.  
 
In addition, the preliminary ruling procedure may also be used for another purpose, i.e. to 
contest the legality of EC measures. In that regard one should bear in mind that in the case of 
direct review of legality, the ECJ has narrowly defined the criteria for standing.
66
 Therefore, 
referring a question to ECJ may be seen as an alternative way of judicial review. Regulations, 
as measures having a general application, can be challenged this way. The ECJ held that the 
legality of decisions can also be reviewed via Article 234 EC, without having assessed 
whether the parties in the main proceedings could have brought a direct action.
67
 In its 
subsequent case law the ECJ restricted this very generous interpretation and held that an 
action before the national courts is not admissible once the time-limits for a direct action 
under Article 230 EC have expired.
68
 
 
The EC Treaty also provides for a more restraint preliminary ruling procedure in cases of 
visas, asylum, immigration and other policies on the free movement of persons. First, only 
national courts of last instance have to refer a question, if they consider that a decision on the 
question is necessary to enable them to give judgment.
69
 Moreover, the ECJ’s jurisdiction is 
limited as certain measures relating to the maintenance of law and order and the safeguarding 
of internal security are excluded from the scope of giving a ruling.
70
 Finally, the Council, the 
Commission or a Member State may also request the ECJ to give a ruling on a question of 
interpretation of the relevant Treaty provisions (Title IV) or of acts of the institutions of the 
Community based therein. In such a case, the ruling given by the ECJ will not apply to 
judgments of national courts which have already become res judicata.
 71
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The preliminary ruling system can be considered as a mechanism through which national 
courts and the ECJ engage in a discourse on the interpretation and application of Community 
law, when it is in conflict with national rules. Although Article 234 EC was originally 
intended to establish a horizontal and bilateral relationship, over the years it has developed 
more into establishing a vertical and multilateral relationship. It can thus be said that the 
European courts sit at the apex of the Community-wide judicial hierarchy.
72
 There are, 
however, serious disadvantages of the preliminary ruling system. First of all, the action is 
dependant on whether the national court actually refers the question to the ECJ. Further, the 
case will go to at least two judicial bodies instead of one. Finally, the party wishing to 
challenge the Community measure this way may have difficulties in finding an actual 
defendant.
73
  
 
C. Jurisdiction under the Second and Third Pillar of the EU 
 
Under the second pillar, that is Common Foreign and Security Policy, the European Courts 
have no jurisdiction whatsoever. On the other hand, the ECJ also has jurisdiction in certain 
cases under the so-called third pillar of the EU Treaty, Police and Judicial Co-operation in 
Criminal Matters. 
 
The ECJ has jurisdiction, subject to certain conditions, to give preliminary rulings  
 
(i) on the validity and interpretation of framework decisions and decisions;  
(ii) on the interpretation of conventions established; and  
(iii) on the validity and interpretation of the measures implementing them.  
 
However, in these cases Member States have to expressly accept the jurisdiction of the ECJ to 
give preliminary rulings.
74
 However, the ECJ does not have jurisdiction to review the validity 
or proportionality of operations carried out by the police or other law enforcement services of 
a Member State or the exercise of the responsibilities incumbent upon Member States with 
regard to the maintenance of law and order and the safeguarding of internal security.
75
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The ECJ, on the other hand, has jurisdiction to review the legality of framework decisions and 
decisions in actions brought by a Member State or the Commission on grounds of lack of 
competence, infringement of an essential procedural requirement, infringement of this Treaty 
or of any rule of law relating to its application, or misuse of powers. There is a two-month 
deadline for such a challenge.
76
 
 
Further, the ECJ has jurisdiction to rule on any dispute between Member States regarding the 
interpretation or the application of acts adopted, whenever such a dispute cannot be settled by 
the Council within six months.
77
 Finally, the ECJ also has jurisdiction to rule on any dispute 
between Member States and the Commission regarding the interpretation or the application of 
conventions.
78
 
 
2.2.2 Judicial Panels 
 
As pointed out above, so far only one judicial panel has been established, the European Civil 
Service Tribunal.
79
 Its jurisdiction will cover disputes between the European Union and its 
civil service, a jurisdiction currently exercised by the CFI. Its decisions will be subject to 
appeal on questions of law only to the CFI and, in exceptional cases, to review by the ECJ.  
 
The creation of the European Civil Service Tribunal, which should be able to take up its 
functions during 2005, is an important step in the implementation of the reforms of the 
judicial system provided for by the Treaty of Nice. It will enable the length of cases to be 
reduced and their conduct to be improved not only for cases concerning the European Civil 
Service, but for all the proceedings with which the CFI has to deal.
80
  
 
It is expected that the creation of the European Civil Servant Tribunal will imply a transfer of 
between 25 to 30 % of the cases currently brought before the CFI.
81
 This transfer of cases will 
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be able to compensate for the increase in caseload due to the transfer of direct actions also to 
the CFI as of 1 June 2004. Currently also the creation of a Court for the Community Patent is 
under discussion. This is expected to substantially alleviate the workload of the CFI. K. 
Lenaerts views that the creation of such a panel seems to be unavoidable if in the future a 
more substantial transfer of cases from the Court of Justice to the CFI were to be envisaged.
82
 
 
2.3 The Court System in Action 
2.3.1 Procedure 
 
The procedure before the ECJ consists of two parts: written and oral.
83
 However, certain 
aspects of the procedures in direct actions and preliminary rulings differ, which are discussed 
in turn below.  
 
Procedures in direct actions start by a written application addressed and sent to the registry. 
As soon as it is received, the application is entered in the register. The registrar publishes a 
notice of the action and of the applicant’s claims in the Official Journal. A judge-rapporteur 
and an Advocate General are then appointed. However, the ECJ may decide that the case will 
be determined without an opinion if the case raises no new point of law.
84
 The registrar sends 
the plea to the defendant, who has one month to lodge a defence. After that, the applicant may 
submit a reply and the defendant a rejoinder, within one month in each case. The president of 
the ECJ may specifically authorise an extension of the above mentioned deadlines.  
 
As a preliminary objection, the defendant may argue that the action is inadmissible (e.g. the 
plaintiff has no standing, i.e. was not entitled to file an action, a time limit has not been 
observed, etc.). This submission is made in a separate document, to which the plaintiff may 
reply. Then the ECJ has to decide on this objection; it may uphold (and end the procedure) or 
dismiss it (continue).
85
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The ECJ decides, upon reading the preliminary report of the judge-rapporteur and hearing the 
views of the Advocate General, whether any preparatory inquiry is necessary and to what 
body the case should be assigned. In case of a preparatory enquiry, the ECJ will prescribe the 
measures it considers necessary (e.g. personal appearance of the parties, oral testimony, an 
inspection of the place or thing in question).
86
 Further, it may also summon and examine 
witnesses and experts either on its own motion or after an application of a party.
87
 
 
Once the written procedure is completed, the next step is the public hearing on the date set by 
the president of the ECJ. However, if none of the parties indicated reasons for to be heard, the 
ECJ may decide otherwise.
88
 In a Report for the Hearing, the judge-rapporteur summarises 
the facts alleged and the arguments of the parties and the interveners, if any. The report is 
made public in the language of the case at the hearing. At the hearing, the parties argue the 
case before the judges and the Advocate General (unless the case is decided without an 
opinion by the Advocate General). The judges and the Advocate General may ask any 
questions from the parties. However, the parties may only address the ECJ through their legal 
representatives.
89
 After the hearing, the Advocate General delivers his or her opinion orally in 
open court. This ends the oral stage of the procedure.  
 
Next, the judge-rapporteur prepares a draft judgment, which is circulated among the judges. 
Each of the judges may propose changes. The judges deliberate in closed session,
90
 and the 
deliberations are to remain secret.
91
 The ECJ delivers its judgment in open court.  
 
Procedures for a preliminary ruling start when the national court submits its question(s) to the 
ECJ concerning the interpretation or validity of a provision of Community law, generally in 
the form of a judicial decision in accordance with national procedural rules. The decision of a 
national court to refer a question for a preliminary ruling is communicated to the Member 
States in the original as well as in a translated version.
92
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The parties, the Member States and the Community institutions may submit written 
observations to the ECJ. The remainder of the procedure is identical to that in direct actions. 
All those entitled to submit written observations may also present their arguments orally at the 
hearing, if a hearing is held.  
 
When the Advocate General has delivered his or her opinion, the ECJ may request 
clarification form the national court. After the judges have deliberated, the judgment is 
delivered in open court and sent by the Registrar to the national court, the Member States and 
the institutions concerned.  
 
In cases where a preliminary ruling has been issued by the ECJ, the parties in the main 
proceedings may not request a revision or interpretation of that judgment, however, if new 
issues have arisen or if questions arise regarding to the application of the preliminary ruling 
the national court may refer again to the ECJ.
93
 
 
Table 1. Summary of procedure before the ECJ 
Source: The ECJ 
 
Written procedure  
  
Direct actions and appeals  
- Written application 
- Service of the application on the 
defendant - Publication of the 
application in the Official Journal 
- Defence 
- Reply 
- Rejoinder 
References for a preliminary ruling  
- Order or judgment of the national 
court 
- Translation of the request for a 
preliminary ruling into all the 
Community languages and notification 
to the parties, the Member States and 
the Community institutions 
- Publication of the request for a 
preliminary ruling in the Official 
Journal 
- Written observations of the parties, 
the Member States and the 
Community institutions 
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Oral procedure 
  
- (Hearing) 
- (Opinion of the Advocate General) 
- Deliberation of the Court 
- Judgment 
 
2.3.3 Activities 
 
The 2004 annual report of the Court of Justice reports the following statistics.
94
  
 
A. ECJ 
 
It is interesting to note that for the first time in the history of the ECJ, in 2004 we may 
observe a decrease in the backlog of judicial activities of the ECJ. The ECJ explains this from 
the cumulative effect of the measures taken to improve the efficiency of the methods of work 
of the Court, the implementation of the changes made by the Treaty of Nice to the working of 
the Court, and the arrival of 10 new judges following enlargement is clearly visible in the 
Court’s judicial statistics for 2004.
95
 The number of cases brought to a close in 2004 increased 
by approximately 30%, that of cases pending fell by about 14%, and there was a considerable 
improvement in the duration of proceedings before the ECJ. In 2004, the ECJ thus brought 
603 cases to a close (net figure, taking account of joined cases). Of those, 375 were dealt with 
by judgments and 226 gave rise to orders. Those figures show a considerable increase over 
the previous year (455 cases brought to a close). The Court had 531 new cases brought before 
it (561 in 2003, gross figures). There were 840 cases (gross figure) pending at the end of 
2004, compared with 974 at the end of 2003 (see Figure 1). 
 
The upward trend in the length of proceedings observed during previous years changed in 
2004 (see Figure 3). As regards references for preliminary rulings, the length was 
approximately 23 months, whereas it was approximately 25 months in 2003. As regards direct 
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actions, it fell from 25 months in 2003 to 20 months in 2004. The average time taken to deal 
with appeals was 21 months (compared with 28 months in 2003). In 2004 the ECJ made 
differing degrees of use of the various instruments at its disposal to expedite its treatment of 
certain cases (priority treatment, the accelerated or expedited procedure,
96
 the simplified 
procedure and the possibility of giving judgment without an Opinion of the Advocate 
General
97
).  
 
As regards the distribution of cases between the full ECJ (in all its formations) and Chambers 
of judges, the former disposed of almost 12% of the cases brought to a close in 2004, while 
Chambers of five judges and Chambers of three judges disposed of 54% and 34% of the cases 
respectively. There is a tendency for cases heard by Chambers of five judges to increase in 
number (50% of cases brought to a close in 2002). Five-judge Chambers are thus becoming 
the usual formation for hearing the cases brought before the Court. The substantial increase in 
the number of cases heard by Chambers of three judges should also be pointed out (20% of 
cases brought to a close in 2003).  
                                                 
96
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Figure 1. Cases completed, new cases and cases pending 1999-2004 
Source: Annual report ECJ 2004 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Nature of proceedings of cases completed 1999-2004 
Source: Annual report ECJ 2004 
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Figure 3. Duration of completed cases 1999-2004 (expressed in months) 
Source: Annual report ECJ 2004 
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Figure 4. Subject-matter of the cases completed in 2004 
Source: Annual report ECJ 2004 
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Figure 5. Judgments concerning the failure of Member States failure to fulfil their obligations, outcome 2004 
Source: Annual report ECJ 2004 
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Figure 6. General trend in the activities of the Court (1952-2004) 
Source: Annual report ECJ 2004 
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B. CFI 
 
The number of cases brought before the CFI continued to increase in 2004 (536 compared 
with 466 in 2003, see Figure 7). This increase is partly due to the transfer of cases from the 
ECJ to the CFI. On this basis 48 additional cases were received, namely 21 cases whose 
referral was ordered by the ECJ and 27 new cases lodged by Member States. The increase in 
the number of cases brought may be observed in every field of litigation. In percentage terms, 
proceedings falling within two specific areas, namely staff cases and intellectual property 
cases, account for 48% of the proceedings brought before the Court. The number of cases 
decided, which comes to 361, is close to that of 2003 (339). The number of cases pending 
crossed the critical threshold of 1,000 cases, there being 1,174 such cases as at 31 December 
2004. This number of cases corresponds, as things stand, to more than three years of the 
Court’s work. The average duration of proceedings increased slightly compared with the 
preceding three years: in 2004 the average duration was 22.6 months for cases other than 
those falling within the special areas constituted by intellectual property cases and staff cases 
(see Figure 10). 
 
Figure 7. Cases completed, new cases and cases pending 1995-2004
#
  
Source: Annual report ECJ 2004 
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# the figures include certain groups of identical or related cases (cases concerning milk quotas, customs agents, State aid in 
the Netherlands for service-stations and State aid in the region of Venice, the restructuring of the fisheries sector, and staff 
cases). 
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Figure 8. Nature of proceedings of cases completed 1999-2004 
Source: Annual report ECJ 2004 
 
 
 
Figure 9. Subject-matter of cases completed 2004 
Source: Annual report ECJ 2004 
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Figure 10. Duration of proceeding  of cases completed 2000-2004 
Source: Annual report ECJ 2004 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11. Appeals against decisions of the CFI 1989-2004 
Source: Annual report ECJ 2004 
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2.4. Challenges to the Current Court System 
 
Over the years, the European Court system has encountered various problems, the most 
important of which relate to the delay and the increasing caseload of the courts and closely 
linked with this its preliminary reference procedure. In addition, the language regime of the 
European Union with now, after enlargement, 20 official languages requiring for translation 
of all judgments has also put a burden on the Court’s activities resulting in extra delays and 
the need for more translation staff. Another problem regarding the Community judicial 
system is the limited possibility of direct action for individuals, because of the limitations on 
standing. It is therefore plain that reform of the current judicial system is necessary.
98
 Several 
reform initiatives have already been adopted and put into practice, others are still being 
considered. For the purpose of this article the problems of delay, the preliminary rulings 
system, of seminal importance to the judicial system, the enforcement procedure, access to 
justice by individuals as well as the specific amendments made by the Constitution will be 
briefly discussed.  
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2.4.1. Delay 
 
Over the years the caseload of the Courts has increased considerably. Together with the case 
load also concern about the delay has increased. Delay has undoubtedly been of major 
concern both within and outside the ECJ. This is in particular the case with respect to the 
preliminary reference procedures where national courts seeking a ruling on the question of 
Community law have to wait two years or more for an answer. There are many causes of 
delay, most of which are common to court systems. For example, one factor which affects the 
productivity of any court is the sheer volume of work. However, the specific nature and 
features of the ECJ has undoubtedly multiplied the effect of any other factors.
99
 Several 
initiatives have been undertaken to improve the Court’s efficiency. As was set forth in Section 
2.2. the Nice Treaty has already enabled the ECJ to transfer workload from the ECJ to the CFI 
and judicial panels, today the recently created Civil Service Tribunal. Moreover it created the 
possibility to transfer jurisdiction on preliminary references from the ECJ to the CFI, which is 
however received with some concern by several actors.
100
 Further possibilities for transfer of 
jurisdiction are clearly open.
101
 
 
One problem specific to the Community is the language regime, as already pointed out above. 
Whilst the internal working language of the Court is French, all judgments and opinions have 
to be translated in all official 20 languages. In order to obviate the delay, several proposal 
have been made as regards a more selective publication system so to reduce the need to 
translate a number of texts and documents. In addition, various measures have been designed 
to shorten the time taken in handling proceedings. They aim to set up a time table for each 
case, setting targets for each stage of the procedure.
102
 
 
2.4.2. Preliminary Rulings 
 
The system of preliminary rulings without doubt lies at the very heart of the Community 
judiciary. However, the continued effectiveness of the procedure is particularly vulnerable to 
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the delays that result from the increasing size and sophistication of the caseload of the ECJ. 
During the years, besides the simple increase of the number of cases, the jurisdiction of the 
ECJ regarding preliminary rulings also extended. Although it is true that we may observe that 
the number of questions referred has not changed a lot in the past few years, this number is 
likely to increase in view of the fact that many questions are likely to be referred from courts 
in the new Member States, and that new legislative initiatives will generate litigation across 
the Union, even without taking account of the substantial increase in the Court’s jurisdiction 
which might arise under the new Constitution.  
 
It is also clear that the willingness and readiness of national courts which may refer questions 
depends on the speed at which an answer is given. The prospect of a two-year delay that a 
preliminary ruling procedure would take before the ECJ, may discourage national judges to 
refer preliminary questions to the ECJ. This could encourage even those courts which are 
obliged to refer, to try to avoid to make a reference and resort to one of the exceptions 
(irrelevant question, acte éclaré or acte clair
103
). The parties in the basic disputes before 
national courts, too, may seek to avoid a reference because of the resultant delays. In addition 
to such practical considerations, the fact that individual rights will frequently be in contention 
in national proceedings involving Community law heightens the need for expedition.
104
 
 
Therefore, various options for reform are currently considered seeing to attempts to control 
the number of references made to the Court and aiming to increase the efficient handling of 
references once received, effectively increasing the supply of such services.
105
 In view of the 
steep rise in the number of reference for preliminary rulings between 1990 and 2000 the 
Courts themselves have submitted several proposals for reform.
106
 In their reports of 1999 and 
2000 they consider different ways in which this problem could be tackled.
107
  The first option 
considered is to limit the number of national courts that are empowered to make a reference. 
This option has clearly been inspired by the regime that is currently applicable to Title IV of 
the Treaty concerning visas, asylum, immigration and other policies concerning the free 
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movement of persons (Article 68 EC Treaty), explained above. This option is however 
viewed to be counterproductive as it could encourage litigants at the national level to pursue 
their cases through to the highest courts in order to gain access to the ECJ.
108
 Another option 
that has been considered is to transfer jurisdiction to rule on preliminary questions to the CFI. 
As already explained above, this option was introduced by the Nice Treaty. This has however 
been received with mixed feelings as it is feared to be incompatible with the necessity to 
safeguard the unity and consistency of Community law.
109
 A further option of reform that has 
been proposed is the introduction of a filtering system by means of which the types of cases 
heard by the ECJ are limited. This could take the form of a filter based on the novelty, 
complexity or importance of the question which would prompt the national courts to exercise 
selectivity in choosing the questions they refer. Another possibility of a filter mechanism 
would be to require the referring national courts to propose an answer to the question it refers 
to the ECJ.
110
  
 
2.4.3. Enforcement Procedure 
 
Over the years the workings of the enforcement procedure have been very much criticised 
relating in particular to its alleged ineffectiveness, the lack of constraint on the Commission’s 
discretion to pursue cases as well as the inadequate role that is provided for individuals. To 
some extent the effectiveness has been slightly enhanced by the introduction of the penalty 
procedure in the Treaty which according to the Commission, is actively used in its 
enforcement procedure. In reaction to many complaints by individuals about the working of 
this procedure, the Commission has enhanced the transparency of the procedure.
111
  
 
2.4.4. Limited Possibility for Direct Actions by Individuals 
 
The problem concerns in particular the restricted interpretation of the requirement of 
individual and direct concern of an individual seeking to challenge an act of the Community 
institutions. Pursuant to this requirement, any individual seeking the judicial review of a 
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measure addressed to another person, has to show that he is individually concerned. However, 
the ECJ interpreted this condition in such a manner (the applicant has to show that he or she 
has attributes which distinguish him or her from all other persons and mark him or her in the 
same manner as the addressee) that it is practically impossible for individuals to successfully 
show individual concern before the ECJ. Although there have been some attempts to amend 
this approach, it is still considered to be the current view.
112
 Although of course there is 
always the possibility of indirect action via the national courts, this depends on the 
willingness of the national courts to refer the case to the European courts, whilst there are also 
limitation in this preliminary procedure, as it does not allow all parties concerned by the 
Community act to participate in the proceedings before the European Courts and it is not 
always possible for the Courts to investigate the matter as a direct action against the 
institution that adopted the disputed measure.
113
 The new Constitution tries to remedy some of 
this critique by broadening the possibility of direct actions for individuals. It provides that any 
natural or legal person may institute proceedings against an act addressed to that person or 
which is of direct and individual concern to him or her, and against a regulatory act which is 
of direct concern to him or her and does not entail implementing measures.
114
 Yet, one can 
argue that this change is of limited significance since a regulatory measure does not include 
legislative acts.
115
 
 
2.4.5. Amendments Introduced by the Constitution 
 
The Constitution
116
 is both a treaty subject to the rules of international law and a Constitution 
in that it contains elements of a constitutional nature.
117
 To a large extent, the Constitution 
does nothing more than consolidating the present EC and EU Treaties. However, if the 
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Constitutional treaty will be ratified,
118
 several significant changes relating to the judiciary 
will be introduced, the important ones of which will discussed below.
119
 
 
First of all, the Constitution introduces a change of name of the Court of Justice. The ‘Court 
of Justice of the European Union’ thus shall include the Court of Justice, the General Court 
and specialised courts. It shall ensure that the law is observed in the interpretation and 
application of the Constitution.
120
  
 
Second, in view of the fact that the Constitution will replace the present three-pillar structure 
with one single Union structure, the Court will have jurisdiction over all the provisions of the 
Constitution, with the following exceptions. The Court will have no jurisdiction with respect 
to the common foreign and security policy.
121
 Moreover, in exercising its powers regarding 
the provisions relating to the area of freedom, security and justice, the Court of Justice will 
have no jurisdiction to review the validity or proportionality of operations carried out by the 
police or other law-enforcement services of a Member State or the exercise of the 
responsibilities incumbent upon Member States with regard to the maintenance of law and 
order and the safeguarding of internal security.
122
 Therefore, former second-pillar matters 
(common foreign and security policy) are still excluded from the jurisdiction of the 
Community Courts. However, the Court shall have jurisdiction to monitor that the 
implementation of the common foreign and security policy does not affect the application of 
the procedures and the extent of the powers of the institutions laid down by the Constitution 
for the exercise of the Union competences. The ECJ can rule on application for the judicial 
review of the legality of European decisions providing for restrictive measures against natural 
or legal persons adopted by the Council on the basis of the common foreign and security 
policy.
123
 
 
Regarding former third pillar matters, the Constitution does in no way restrict direct actions, 
the limited preliminary procedure provided for by Article 68 EC and the facultative 
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preliminary procedure of Article 35 TEU.
124
 Further, infringement procedures for failure to 
fulfil an obligation under the Constitution also relate to these matters. The above amounts to a 
considerable improvement compared to the present situation, in particular in view of the 
potential significance of the rights included in the Charter of Fundamental Rights and of the 
unity of Union law (especially for the Union’s international private law).
125
  
 
Third, as already indicated above, the Constitution will also facilitate individuals’ access to 
the Court. In addition, a new provision is inserted requiring the Member States to provide 
remedies sufficient to ensure effective legal protection in the fields covered by Union law.
126
 
Finally, a change of administrative nature is that an advisory panel is to be established to 
formulate an opinion on the suitability of the candidates for judges and Advocates General.
127
 
 
2.4.6. Towards a New Judicial Architecture?  
 
The president of the ECJ, Mr. Vassilios Skouris recently pointed out that the Court of Justice 
is now preparing one of its greatest challenges of reform in its 52-year history.
128
 It is clear 
from the above that the reform is still very much open to debate. In a reflection on the judicial 
architecture after the Nice Treaty, J. Weiler made some interesting proposals for reform.
129
 He 
forcefully argues that as the effective operation of the Court is not just a question of workload 
but also of competences and credibility, some more fundamental changes are needed. He thus 
proposes to reverse the habitual positioning of the ECJ and the CFI. It should so be the CFI 
which is to become the centrepiece of the judicial system, ‘its workhorse’ and the ECJ should 
sit at the hierarchical apex as the Supreme Court of the European Union. This reversal would 
entail that the preliminary questions would, in most cases be referred to the CFI.
130
 This 
possibility is currently already provided for in the Treaty.
131
 This would require the CFI also 
to have its own specialized chambers or divisions. Moreover, the number of judges of the CFI 
should be decided purely on a functional basis, which the Nice Treaty already allows for. All 
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this would mean that the CFI would have the plenary jurisdiction under the existing 
jurisdiction of the ECJ. It would thus entertain both direct actions and preliminary rulings. 
The elevated number of judges would be able to eliminate the current delays.  
 
In Weiler’s vision, the ECJ would become a kind of European supreme court. It would have 
jurisdiction in cases of appeal in direct actions and, this would be new, appeal from 
preliminary rulings. In cases where a preliminary reference is made by the highest courts, 
Weiler proposes to include an ad-hoc judge of that court, albeit not from the group of judges 
deciding the case. This recast ECJ has an impact on its composition and should reflect on 
attracting judges with experience in constitutional matters. Weiler furthermore argues that the 
style of judicial decisions should be changed as it is outmoded, does not reflect the dialogical 
nature of European constitutionalism and is no basis for constitutional relationship between 
the European court and its national counterparts. He proposes that the Court moves towards 
more discursive, analytical and conversational style that is habitual in the common law world, 
whilst the Court would also be asked to show that national sensibilities are taken into account. 
In this new architecture, a proactive relationship between the national and European courts 
should be encouraged. A new style of conversation between these courts should then 
encourage national courts at all levels not merely to ask the question but also to propose what 
they think the correct solution should be, and importantly, also to inform the European court 
in the referring question itself of the constitutional and other concerns that the national legal 
order has.
132
 
 
2.5. The European Court System Compared: the Andean, African 
and ASEAN Systems 
 
2.5.1. The Andean Judicial Dispute Settlement Mechanism 
A. The Andean Community 
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The Andean Community finds its origins in 1969 in the Cartagena Protocol of 1969 (the 
Andean Pact) establishing a customs union within a period of ten years. Over the next three 
decades, Andean integration passed through a series of different stages. Important 
institutional and policy reforms were made by the Protocols of Trujillo and Sucre of 1996 and 
1997. The institutional reforms created the Andean Community and the Andean Integration 
System. Importantly, the policy reforms extended the scope of integration beyond the purely 
trade and economic areas. The Andean Community started operating on August 1, 1997 with 
a Secretariat General, whose headquarters are in Lima (Peru), as its executive body. The 
Council of Presidents and the Council of Foreign Ministers were formally established as new 
policy-making and leadership bodies.  
 
B. The Institutional Structure of the Andean Community  
 
The institutional structure of the Andean Community is similar to that of the European Union 
(see Figure 12.). Its main institutions are the Council, the Commission, the Secretariat 
General, the Andean Parliament and the Court of Justice of the Andean Community. The 
Presidential Andean Council is the highest institution of the Andean System of Integration 
(SAI) and can be compared with the European Council. It consists of the Heads of State or 
Government of the Member States. It meets once a year, and every time they consider 
necessary. There is a president that rotates every year in alphabetic order. The Council defines 
the politics of the integration; it orientates and stimulates the actions in matters of interest of 
the Sub-region; evaluates the development and the results of the process of integration; it 
expresses pronouncements on the reports and recommendations presented by the organs and 
institutions of the Andean System of Integration.  
 
The Andean Council of Ministers of Foreign affairs gives political direction to the 
development of the integration process. It needs  to assure the attainment of the aims of the 
process of the integration and to formulate and execute the foreign affairs politics of the 
Andean Community. The Commission is the legislative organ of the Andean System of 
Integration. Their members are plenipotentiary representatives of each one of the Countries 
Members, whose legislative capacity expressed in the adoption of Decisions, shares it now 
with the Ministers’ Andean Council of Foreign affairs. The Commission formulates, executes 
and evaluates the politics of the Andean integration; it adopts the necessary measures for the 
 47 
achievement of the objectives of the Agreement of Cartagena, as well as for the fulfilment of 
the Directives of the Presidential Andean Council. The Secretariat General of the Andean 
Community is the executive organ that is the responsible to administer the process, is the 
guardian of the community commitment. It has capacity of initiative to formulate proposition 
of Decision to The Andean Council of Ministers of Foreign affairs and to the Commission, as 
well as initiatives and suggestions to facilitate or to accelerate the fulfilment of the Agreement 
of Cartagena. Hence the tasks performed by the Andean Commission and the Secretariat 
General can be compared to the tasks carried out by the European Commission.  
 
The Andean Parliament represents the people of the Andean Community. Nowadays, it is 
composed by representatives of the national parliaments. Its tasks are to take part in the 
legislative process, by suggestions to the organs of the System and it presents projects of 
common interest. Moreover, it needs to promote the harmonization of the legislations of the 
Member States and the relations of cooperation and coordination with the Parliaments of the 
Andean countries and of third countries. In conclusion, the Court of Justice of the Andean 
Community is the judicial organ of the Andean Community. 
 
 
Figure 12. The institutional structure of the Andean Community 
Source: Andean Community, http://www.comunidadandina.org/ingles/who.htm 
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C. The Andean System of Dispute Settlement 
 
The Andean Court of Justice is composed of five judges, with one judge of each one of the 
Member States. The judges are pointed for six years, with territorial competition in five 
countries and with permanent headquarters in Quito, Ecuador. The judges must be nationals 
of the Member Countries, enjoy a good moral reputation, and fulfil the necessary conditions 
for exercising the highest judicial functions in their respective countries or be highly 
competent jurists.
133
 The Court controls the legality of the Community norms and interprets 
the Community norms to assure the uniform application of these in the territory of the 
Member States. Like the European Union, also the Andean Community has specific 
procedures for dispute settlement, which also can be divided into direct actions (action for 
annulment of Community measures
134
 or inaction of the institutions,
135
 infringement 
procedure
136
 and arbitration
137
 and staff
138
 cases) and preliminary rulings.  
 
I. Direct Actions 
 
i) The Infringement Procedure 
 
The infringement procedure before the Andean Court is similar to the one before the 
European Court. Article 23 of the Treaty of the Andean Court enables the Secretariat General, 
which considers that a Member State has failed to fulfil an obligation under the legal order of 
the Andean Community, to bring the matter before the Andean Court. Also Member States 
are allowed to bring a case against an alleged infringement of another Member States before 
the Court.
139
 The procedure requires that the Secretariat General shall deliver a reasoned 
opinion informing the Member State concerned of the infringement. The Member State 
concerned is then given the opportunity to submit its own case and its observations within a 
period of 60 days maximum. Upon the reaction of the Member State or upon the expiry of the 
time limit, the Secretariat General will give an administrative ruling on the state of 
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compliance. In case the Secretariat General views that there is a situation of non-compliance, 
it will start procedures before the Andean Court. 
 
Also Member States may bring a case about an alleged infringement of another Member State 
before the Court. In that case, just as is the case with the European judicial procedures, that 
Member State is required to first complain to the Secretariat General of the Andean 
Community. If the Secretariat General of the Andean Community has not delivered an 
opinion within 65 days of the date on which the matter was brought before it, the Member 
State may bring the case directly before the Court of Justice. 
 
It was only in 1996 that a first case concerning the infringement procedure brought before the 
Andean Court was successful. This case was initiated by the former Joint Committee of the 
Cartagena Agreement (now the Secretariat General of the Andean Community). Since 1996 
there have been 79 cases for infringement brought before the Andean Court. Of these cases 70 
cases have been initiated by the Secretariat General whilst only 3 cases were initiated by the 
Member States. In the period from 1995 till 2004, the Secretariat General issued 176 
administrative rulings establishing an infringement of the Andean norms (see Figure 13).
140
  
 
Interestingly from a European perspective, also individuals whose rights are affected by the 
failure of the Member State to fulfil its obligations are allowed to bring a case before the 
Court. They however first have to complain to the Secretariat General in accordance with the 
procedure prescribed for the Member States.
141
 
 
 
Figure 13. Resolutions of the Secretariat General Establishing an Infringement of the Andean norms ( 1995 - 
October, 2004) (AEC = common external tariffs and SAFP = Andean system of prices) 
Source: SG/dt 258/Rev.1, 22 de octubre de 2004, 0.11.10, Solución De Controversias Derivadas De 
Incumplimientos En La Comunidad Andina  
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ii) Action for annulment of measures or inaction of the institutions 
The Andean Court has also jurisdiction to review the legality of acts adopted by the Andean 
Institutions. Contrary to the European situation in which the voting behaviour of Member 
States is not of any significance for the legal standing before the European Court, in the 
Andean judicial system, Member States can only bring an action before the Court against acts 
that were approved without their affirmative vote.
142
 The possibility for natural or legal 
persons to initiate proceeding against acts adopted by the Andean Institutions seems 
somewhat broader than in the European system as the acts must affect their subjective rights 
or their legitimate interests (in the European situation: ‘of individual and direct concern’). As 
of 1996, this procedure was used six times of which only two were declared admissible. 
 
Figure 14. Total number of cases brought before the Andean Court of Justice 
Source: SG/dt 258/Rev.1, 22 de octubre de 2004, 0.11.10, Solución De Controversias Derivadas De 
Incumplimientos En La Comunidad Andina 
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Figure 15. Infringement procedure: Cases completed and pending before the Andean Court (1996-2004) 
Source SG/dt 258/Rev.1, 22 de octubre de 2004, 0.11.10, Solución De Controversias Derivadas De 
Incumplimientos En La Comunidad Andina.  
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II. Preliminary Rulings 
 
As already indicated above, also the Andean Court System disposes of a preliminary ruling 
system. Any court or tribunal of a Member State may, if it considers that a decision on the 
question is necessary to enable it to give judgment, requests the Court of Justice to give a 
‘prejudgment’ on the interpretation of acts of the institutions of the Andean Community.
143
 
Since 1987 until April, 2004, the Andean Court has given more than 600 judgments of 
requiring a preliminary examination interpretation. More than 95 % were about intellectual 
property. Colombia and Ecuador courts have used this procedure most frequently, whilst Perú 
and Venezuela used this procedure only in two occasions. Bolivia used it only once.
144
 
 
2.5.2. The African and ASEAN Systems 
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Also the Asian and African integration processes dispose of dispute settlement 
mechanisms.
145
 In the case of the African Union, the Protocol of the Court of Justice of the 
African Union provides for the establishment of a Court of Justice of the Union, pursuant to 
the Constitutive Act and the Protocol.  
 
The Court has jurisdiction over all disputes and applications referred to it in accordance with 
the Act and the Protocol which, among others, may concern: 
 
(a) the interpretation and application of the Act and the Union treaties and all subsidiary 
legal instruments adopted within the framework of the Union; 
(b) all acts, decisions, regulations and directives of the organs of the Union; 
(c) the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of an 
obligation owed to a State Party or to the Union; 
(d) the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an obligation.
146
 
 
The Court, therefore, performs three of the functions of an international judicial system, that 
are peacefully settling disputes, offering legal advice and properly interpreting the 
controversial articles of the constitutional law. The rationale having taken into account being 
that first, the peaceful settlement of disputes is deemed a common denominator under all 
international judicial systems. Within the context of the African Union this function is further 
considered of major importance as it stands the only means to maintaining international and 
regional peace and security. Furthermore, the advisory function plays another key role 
asserting the need for a judicial system within the African Union. Finally, the Act’s 
interpretation stands also a major function of any international organisation’s court of 
justice.
147
 
 
Another international organisation, the COMESA (Common Market for Eastern and Southern 
Africa) also has established its own Court of Justice. As pointed out, the Court of Justice 
benefits the process of economic integration since it provides one integrated strong judicial 
body rather than three weak judicial bodies. Furthermore, a strong Court of Justice addresses 
the issue of enforcement of decisions taken collectively and also allows for legal or natural 
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persons affected by any act of the organs of the community or its member states, or unlawful 
infringement of the provisions of the Treaty, to request the Court to determine the legality of 
such acts.
148
 In that regard it is worth noting that the COMESA, besides being created by law, 
pursues its aims exclusively through a new body of law, that is COMESA law, which is 
independent and uniform in all the member states of the COMESA. Therefore, the COMESA 
legal system needs an effective system of judicial safeguards when the law is challenged or 
must be applied. The Court of Justice, as the judicial organ of the COMESA is the backbone 
of such a system of safeguards. Its judges will ensure that the law is interpreted and applied in 
each member state uniformly. In order to fulfil that role, the Court of Justice has jurisdiction 
to hear disputes to which member states, the Secretary General and residents of member states 
(individuals and legal persons) may be parties.
149
 
 
Interestingly enough, the ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) has no judicial 
body which could be described as equivalent to the European Court of Justice. In that regard 
it has to be pointed out that at the Ninth ASEAN Summit in Bali, ASEAN leaders have agreed 
to establish an ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) by 2020. In lieu of that, several sources 
call for the establishment of a judicial organ. It is argued that the main idea of the ASEAN 
integration is of economic nature, relatively similar to that of European Union. Bearing that in 
mind, one can conclude that the substantial link between economic integration and legal 
cooperation is that economic integration serves as the goal and legal cooperation functions as 
one of the means to achieve it.
150
 Presently, the opportunities to implement legal cooperation 
among ASEAN members are opening wide. Furthermore, if possible, a higher degree of legal 
cooperation such as ASEAN Arbitral Tribunal or even an ASEAN Court of Justice needs to 
be established, dealing with an agenda ranging from human rights to breach of contract.
151
 In 
concert with that, at one of the round tables to which the above initiative has given rise to, it 
was argued that ASEAN should consider setting up two supranational bodies, one of them 
being an ASEAN Court of Justice, which is to be responsible for dispute settlement.
152
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3. Alternative Dispute Settlement Mechanisms 
 
As already indicated above, the dispute settlement by means of the courts is not the only 
means of dispute settlement in the European Union. In addition to these ‘last resort’ judicial 
mechanism, over the years the European Union has created many alternative, ‘soft-law’ 
mechanisms consisting of various initiatives and or the creation of various platforms for both 
Member States, institutions and individuals to resolve their conflicts. Next to these, what we 
may call alternative or out-of-court dispute settlement mechanisms, we may also observe 
several mechanisms that aim to prevent disputes from occurring.  
3.1. Disputes Between Members States and the Commission 
 
3.1.1. Comitology as a Problem-Solving Forum  
 
Already since the early existence of the Community, the Community disposes of a mechanism 
by means of which the Council delegates powers to the Commission. This delegation of 
powers is conditional in the sense that the Commission, in the exercise of its powers and 
before adopting any decisions needs to consult committees that are composed of national 
representatives which are created for that purpose. This system is known as ‘comitology’. 
Although there has been a great deal of debate on the functioning of these committees, as 
their existence would upset the institutional balance of powers and there was a great lack of 
transparency of their operation, both empirical research and theoretical underpinnings have 
argued that over the years decision-making involving comitology has led to a more 
consensual and problem-solving approach to decision-making between the Commission and 
the committees. Being both bureaucrats and national representatives at the same time, 
committees act as co-ordinating bodies between supranational and national, and governmental 
and social actors and may (but not always do) voice national viewpoints. 
 
Here the dual character of these committees must be emphasized: committees are composed 
of national representatives who generally, but not necessarily, are civil servants. On the one 
hand, these committees, in their composition of national bureaucrats, function as a forum of 
interaction and co-operation between the Member States and the Commission. In this way, the 
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significance of purely national interest has been diminished, contributing to the overall trend 
of greater transnational decision-making, in which national interests are replaced by technical 
expertise, socio-economic interests and administration. On the other hand, however, these 
committees, in their composition of national representatives, have acted as ‘mini Councils’. 
They potentially enhance the importance of the national interests and contribute to the decline 
of supranational decision-making. These committee mechanisms generally provide for co-
operation between all the levels concerned and might address Member States’ concerns for 
unnecessary Community activities. Seen in this light committees might be argued to have 
pragmatically secured subsidiarity. The participation of committees in the executive action of 
the Commission may therefore be argued to create a framework for cooperative and 
deliberative multilevel policy-making,
153
 and makes the action of the Commission more 
democratic and ‘closer to the citizen’,
154 
whilst producing good and effective decision-
making. Committees may, moreover, contribute to a less top-down approach in the sense of 
less ‘Brussels’ (i.e. the Commission) – and more ‘Member State’ participation, and therefore, 
citizen participation. Moreover, committees may complement the limited staff resources in 
the Commission.
155 
Certainly, in terms of efficiency and transparency, the comitology practice 
has left much to be desired. Although these drawbacks have to some extent been addressed by 
the 1999 Comitology Decision, they still beg for improvement. In view of the accession of the 
new Member States reform of the comitology system is necessary. This problem will not be 
resolved by the new Constitution.
156
 
 
 
3.1.2. Prevention of Conflicts and ‘Out-of-court’ Dispute Settlement in the 
Field of Food Safety 
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In view of the sensitivities of food safety regulation, the Community legislation has provided 
for two interesting procedures which see to conflict situations, one procedure concerns 
conflicts in scientific opinion and the other concerns conflicts between Member States.  
 
A. Scientific ‘Conflicts’ 
 
First, in addition to the embedment of EFSA in networks of national authorities and scientists 
and the installation of a possibility of administrative review as regards acts of the EFSA in the 
framework of the GM food and feed regulation,
157
 the General Food Law (GFL) encourages 
the convergence of opinions of European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) and other European 
and national bodies by pro-actively encountering possible conflicting opinions. Thus the 
General Food Law requires first EFSA to be vigilant in determining the possibility of 
diverging scientific opinions at an early stage of the analysis process. It ‘shall exercise 
vigilance in order to identify at an early stage any potential source of divergence between its 
scientific opinions and the scientific opinions issued by other bodies carrying out similar 
tasks’.
 158
 Subsequently, the GFL addresses the problem of the actual existence of ‘diverging 
scientific’ opinions of national authorities and/or other European organs and the EFSA. In 
order to prevent situations such as the conflict on the lift of the export ban on British beef
159
 
from recurring in the future, the GFL imposes a kind of duty of cooperation on the EFSA and 
the bodies involved.
160
 It herewith builds on an informal practice of the Scientific Committee 
on Foodstuffs which acted as ‘arbiter’ (with an advisory status) in conflicts between Member 
States as regards the free movement of certain foodstuffs and provided scientific assessments 
of the requests for approval for any compound or preparation of food by a manufacturer, 
which were submitted to the Commission.
161
 Where EFSA is aware of a potential divergence 
in opinion between it and a national authority, it must contact the national authority to ensure 
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that they share all of the relevant information and to identify the points on which there is 
potential divergence.
162
 
 
In the case of a substantial divergence of opinion, EFSA and the national authority or other 
Community organs with the divergent opinion shall be obliged to cooperate with a view to 
resolving the divergence.
163
 It is important to note that, in view of the fact that EFSA has not 
been conferred upon the power to resolve the conflict, it here operates more as a kind of 
‘watchdog’.
164
 In case of diverging scientific points of view, it is not automatically EFSA’s 
advice which is determinant. In such cases, the advice of other bodies must, rightly so, be 
taken into account. In case EFSA and the bodies concerned cannot come to a common 
solution and ‘substantive divergence over scientific issues’ continues to exist, they are 
required to submit a joint document to the Commission in which the contentious scientific 
issues are clarified and the scientific uncertainties are identified and communicated to the 
Commission.
165
 It may be wondered whether in such cases a credible compromise can be 
reached. Damien Chalmers even warns that in situations where different methodologies or 
opposing data are used, a joint document could be used to undermine the credibility of the 
other. Such a document could therefore highlight internal crises of sciences and provoke 
crises of confidence in scientific expectations, and, at the same time, promote beliefs in a 
zero-risk world. This, in turn, could affect confidence in the analytical rigour of the EFSA.
166
  
 
B. Member State vs Member State: the Mediation Procedure 
 
Second, the GFL introduces a, what is called, mediation procedure which concerns situations 
of conflicts between Member States.
167
 In these cases the Commission acts as a mediator. 
This mediation procedure resembles the above mentioned ‘conflict procedure’. If one 
Member State considers that another Member States’ measure is either not compatible with 
the provisions laid down in the GFL or with the internal market, the Member State informs 
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the Commission of the measure. The two Member States and the Commission shall, so the 
GFL prescribes, ‘make every effort to solve the problem’. If no agreement is reached, the 
Commission may request EFSA to give an opinion on any relevant contentious scientific 
issue. A similar procedure already exists in the field of medicines and seems quite 
successful.
168
 The practice in the field of GMO’s shows that this is likely to be more difficult 
in the field of foodstuffs. The introduction of the mediation procedure certainly is an 
interesting development. Apparently there was a need felt for a procedure outside of the 
normal comitology committee, the SCFCAH. This is all the more interesting as the SCFCAH 
has formally been assigned a broader task outside of the comitology procedure, being allowed 
to examine ‘any issue falling under those provisions, either at the initiative of the Chairman or 
at the written request of one of its members’.
169
 Does this mean that deliberate problem-
solving within the framework of the SCFCAH is at risk or does it ‘simply’ give expression to 
the need for pursuing a faster and slimmer procedure outside of the forum offered by the 
SCFAH? 
 
3.2. Disputes Between Individuals and the EU Institutions: the 
Ombudsman  
 
The position of European Ombudsman was created by the 1992 Treaty on the European 
Union. The Ombudsman acts as an intermediary between the citizen and the EU authorities. 
In April 2003 Mr Nikiforos Diamandouros was appointed Ombudsman. The Ombudsman is 
entitled to receive and investigate complaints from EU citizens, businesses and institutions, 
and from anyone residing or having their legal domicile in a Member States. The Ombudsman 
is elected by the European Parliament for a renewable term of five years. He helps to uncover 
‘maladministration’ in the European institutions and other EU bodies. ‘Maladministration’ 
means poor or failed administration. Examples are abuse of power, discrimination, 
unnecessary delay etc. The Ombudsman carries out investigations on his own initiative or 
following a complaint. A complaint can be made by using the electronic complaint form that 
is available on the website of the European Ombudsman.
170
 If the Ombudsman discovers a 
case of maladministration, he informs the institution concerned and makes draft 
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recommendations. The institution concerned has three months to give its detailed opinion on 
the matter. The Ombudsman then submits a report to the European Parliament and to the 
institution concerned. He also lets the complainant know the outcome of the investigations. 
Every year, the Ombudsman gives the European Parliament a report on all his investigations. 
 
The Ombudsman received in 2003 2,436 complaints, a 10% increase compared to 2002. 
Partly this was due to a concerted effort to inform citizens of their rights. Nearly half the 
complaints were sent to the Ombudsman electronically, either by e-mail or using the 
complaint form on the Ombudsman’s website. In almost 70% of the cases, the Ombudsman 
was able to help the complainant by opening an inquiry into the case, transferring it to a 
competent body, or giving advice on where to turn for a prompt and effective solution to the 
problem. A total of 253 new inquiries were opened during the year. The Ombudsman also 
dealt with a large number of requests for information, of which 2,538 were sent by e-mail. 
The Ombudsman made decisions closing 180 cases following inquiries. In 87 cases, the 
Ombudsman’s inquiry revealed no maladministration. In 48 cases, the Ombudsman’s inquiry 
resulted in the institution or body concerned settling the case to the full satisfaction of the 
complainant. While 7 proposals for friendly solutions were still under consideration at the end 
of 2003, 4 were achieved in the course of the year.
 171
 
 
 
3.3. Disputes Between Individuals and the Commission in the Area 
of Competition Law: Enforcement 
 
In the field of competition law, the Commission has important powers in problem-solving, 
having been conferred upon strong powers of enforcement of competition provisions. 
Following the reform of 2003 which introduced a more decentralised regime, the Commission 
still is charged with the duty of ensuring that Articles 81 (cartels) and 82 (dominant position) 
of the EC Treaty are implemented.
172
 Hence, the Commission has been granted both 
investigative and inspection powers. The Commission has broad investigative powers such as 
the power to request information, the power to take statements and the power to carry out 
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certain inspections.
173
 Where the Commission, acting on a complaint or on its own initiative, 
finds that there is an infringement of Article 81 or of Article 82 of the Treaty, it may by 
decision require the undertakings and associations of undertakings concerned to bring such 
infringement to an end.
174
 For this purpose, it may impose on them any behavioural or 
structural remedies, which are proportionate to the infringement committed and necessary to 
bring the infringement effectively to an end. Natural or legal persons who can show a 
legitimate interest and Member States are entitled to file a complaint. An elaborate 
Commission Notice is available on the details of filing such a complaint.
175
 In a decision the 
Commission can finally impose sanctions, such as fines and periodic penalty payments.
176
 
Further details on the conduct of the proceedings are laid down in Regulation 773/2004.
177
 
 
3.4. Disputes Between Individuals and Member States: SOLVIT 
 
SOLVIT is an on-line problem-solving network in which the Member States work together to 
solve without legal proceedings problems caused by the misapplication of Internal Market law 
by public authorities.
178
 There is a SOLVIT centre in every Member State (as well as in 
Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein). SOLVIT Centres can help with handling complaints 
from both citizens and businesses. They are part of the national administration and promise to 
provide solutions to problems within 10 weeks. SOLVIT has been working since July 2002 
and using SOLVIT is free of charge. The European Commission coordinates the network, 
which is operated by the Member States, the European Commission provides the database 
facilities and, when needed, helps to speed up the resolution of problems. The Commission 
also passes formal complaints it receives on to SOLVIT if there is a good chance that the 
problem can be solved without legal action. Producers or traders can submit a case to 
SOLVIT when their complaint is caused by an incorrect application of EC law and when their 
complaint is addressed at a public authority. The handling of disputes between business-to-
business or consumer-to-business fall outside the scope of SOLVIT. The policy areas 
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SOLVIT has mostly dealt with so far concern recognition of professional qualifications and 
diplomas, access to education, residence permits, voting rights, social security, employment 
rights, driving licences, motor vehicle registration, border controls, market access for 
products, market access for services, establishment as self-employed, public procurement, 
taxation and free movement of capital or payments. 
 
Figure 16.  Operation of SOLVIT mechanism. 
Source: http://europa.eu.int/solvit/ 
 
 
 
 
 
3.5. Disputes Between Individuals 
3.5.1. Alternative Dispute Resolution in Civil and Commercial Matters 
 
The European Council has repeatedly stressed the importance of alternative means of settling 
disputes, in particular in Vienna in December 1998 and then in Tampere in October 1999 at 
the meeting devoted to the creation of an area of freedom, security and justice within the 
European Union. Also at the Lisbon March 2000 European Council meeting, the Commission 
was asked to consider alternative dispute resolution systems. In the employment relations’ 
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field, the Brussels European Council of December 2001 stressed the importance of voluntary 
mediation mechanism.
179
 
 
Alternative dispute resolution (ADR) is defined by the Commission as out-of-court dispute 
resolution processes conducted by a neutral third party, excluding arbitration power.
180
 
Arbitration is closer to quasi-judicial procedure than to ADR as arbitrators’ awards replace 
judicial decisions. A distinction is made by the Commission
181
 between ADR conducted by 
courts or entrusted by the court to a third party (‘ADRs in the context of judicial 
proceedings’) and ADRs used by the parties to a dispute through an out-of-court procedure 
(‘Conventional ADRs). A second distinction is made between the different conventional ADR 
procedures. In certain ADR procedures the third party responsible can be called upon to take a 
decision that is binding for one party (often the case with Ombudsmen) or make a 
recommendation to the parties which they are free to follow or not (as is the case with the 
Consumer Complaint Boards in Scandinavian countries).
182
 In other ADR procedures, the 
third party does not formally adopt a position on the possible means of resolving the dispute 
but simply help the parties come to an agreement.
183
 A public opinion survey of 2004 reveals 
that 60 % of EU citizens are aware of the existence of alternative mechanisms of dispute 
settlement in this area.
184
  
 
3.5.2. Out-of-court Resolution of Consumer Disputes 
 
Measures in the field of consumer protection have been undertaken within the framework of a 
program aimed at providing consumers with better access to justice.
185
 Directive 98/27/EC on 
injunctions for the protection of consumer interests was adopted.
186
 Under this Directive, the 
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Member States must enable independent public bodies and consumer organisations to bring 
actions for an injunction against certain commercial practices. The Commission has adopted 
two recommendations establishing the principles applicable to out-of-court procedures for the 
resolution of consumer disputes. The first recommendation, which was adopted in March 
1998
187
 relates to the procedures, which, no matter what they are called, lead to a resolution of 
the dispute through the active intervention of a third party that formally adopts a position with 
regard to a solution. This recommendation sets out the seven minimum principles for the 
establishment and operation of ADR facilities. It does not relate to the procedures often 
referred to as mediation procedures. A list has been published by the Commission of all the 
bodies in Member States that are responsible for out-of-court resolution of consumer disputes, 
which the Member States consider to be in line with the recommendation.
188
 The second 
recommendation of April 2001
189
 relates to procedures, which are limited to a simple attempt 
to bring the parties together to convince them to find a solution by common consent. The third 
party can however propose a solution informally. These recommendations have been 
accompanied by the publication of the European complaint form for consumers.
190
 This form 
has been designed to ‘guide’ and orient consumers in formulating their claims. It contains 
multiple-choice lists of responses to help consumers indicate their problems and their claims, 
together with sufficient space for users to give additional details or describe particular 
circumstances not covered by the multiple-choice lists. 
 
3.5.3 ECODIR 
 
In the field of electronic commerce ADRs have received particular attention, in particular in 
the e-Europe Action Plan.
191
 This concerns the traditional alternative channels and Online 
Dispute Resolution, which can also be used to resolve disputes that are not related to e-
commerce. An online ADR initiative that is supported by the Commission is ECODIR 
(Electronic Consumer Dispute Resolution Platform).
192
 The whole procedure consists of three 
phases: 1) the negotiation phase, 2) the mediation phase and 3) the recommendation phase.  
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In the negotiation phase the First Party logs in and creates a new user account after having 
checked that the dispute comes within ECODIR dispute resolution rules. The First Party then 
fills out the online invitation to negotiate. Having filed the electronic invitation to negotiate 
form, the First Party receives a confirmation message from the Secretariat via email within 
the next 24 hours. The Second Party will receive the invitation to negotiate from the 
Secretariat and will be given seven days to respond. In the absence of a response, the Second 
Party is deemed to have refused to participate. If the Second Party responds, both Parties 
negotiate in an attempt to find a mutually acceptable solution to the dispute. Subsequently, in 
the absence of agreement, either party may request the assistance of a neutral third party, the 
Mediator (mediation phase). The Secretariat may appoint a Mediator selected from 
ECODIR’s lists
193
 or appoint the mediator chosen by the Parties. The Mediator then reviews 
the file and makes an attempt to bring the Parties to a settlement. The Mediator is proactive 
and can make settlement proposals. In the absence of agreement after 15 days from the 
beginning of the mediation phase, the Mediator makes a recommendation. Except where 
otherwise agreed, the Parties are not bound by this recommendation.  
3.5.4. European Networks: the EEJ-net and the FIN-NET 
 
In the field of consumer protection, the Commission has established two European networks 
of national bodies both aimed at facilitating access for consumers to out-of-court procedures 
for the resolution of cross-border disputes. The European Extra-Judicial Network (EEJ-net)
194
 
is a consumer support and information structure, which consists of national contact points. 
Each of the contact points relays information to the 400 bodies that the MS considered to have 
fulfilled the requirements of the two Commission recommendations. The FIN-NET (Financial 
Services Complaint Network)
195
 is a network of the competent national ADR bodies, which 
meet the requirements of the first Commission recommendation. This network provides 
consumers who have problems related to financial services (bans, insurance companies etc.) 
with direct access to an ADR facility. 
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4. Prevention of Disputes 
 
In addition to providing formal and informal ways of settling disputes the EU has also built in 
mechanisms to prevent disputes from arising. Several important legislative provisions can be 
mentioned in this context. 
 
4.1. The Duty to Co-operate 
 
First, and this goes to the very basis of the Community’s legal order, the EC Treaty imposes 
on the Member States a duty to co-operate and is also called the solidarity obligation. Article 
10 of the EC Treaty thus requires that Member States take all appropriate measures to ensure 
fulfilment of the obligations arising out of this Treaty or resulting from action taken by the 
institutions of the Community. Moreover, they must facilitate the achievement of the 
Community’s tasks, whilst they need to abstain from any measure, which could jeopardise the 
attainment of the objectives of this Treaty. 
 
4.2. The Duty to Notify Draft Standards and Technical Rules 
 
A second important instrument relates to the Community’s objective of free trade. To prevent 
the creation of the barriers to the free movement of goods that can arise from the adoption of 
different national technical regulations, two information procedures have been set up, which 
allows the Commission to learn about the legislative activities that are planned within the 
Member States.
196
 These procedures thus aim to reinforce mutual recognition, and at the same 
time aim to prevent the arising of conflicts due to the creation of unjustified trade barriers.
197
 
The first is the information procedure for standards. Each national standardisation body 
informs the Commission and all the other European and national standardisation bodies 
specified in the Annexes to the Directive of its draft standards or amendments to existing 
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standards. The Commission may also request that it be informed of national standardisation 
programmes, which will then be made available to the other Member States. The Commission 
and the other standardisation bodies may comment on draft standards, in which case they will 
be informed of the follow-up. 
 
The second and most important one is the information procedure for technical rules. Every 
Member State must notify the Commission of its draft technical rules or amendment of 
technical regulations, the grounds for them and, where necessary, the main basic legislative 
and regulatory provisions of the draft regulation. The Commission will inform all the other 
Member States of the draft notified. Their comments will be taken into account, where 
possible, in the final version of the technical regulation. In order to allow the Commission and 
other Member States to react, the Member States must refrain from adopting any draft 
technical regulations for three months from the date of receipt by the Commission. If the 
Commission wishes to propose or adopt a legislative act in the same area or if the draft 
concerns a subject already covered by a Commission proposal, the Member State concerned 
must suspend adoption of the draft for 12 months. If the Council adopts a common position 
during this period, the standstill period will be extended by six months. The notification 
procedure does not apply to technical regulations that are an integral transposition of an 
international or European standard, nor to national regulations on Community technical 
specifications or to other provisions of Community law.
198
 
 
This notification system functions as an ‘early warning’ system and institutes dynamic co-
operation between the national and Community authorities. It envisages a kind of ‘learning 
process’: by means of the information exchange, both the Commission and other national 
authorities can learn of national activities in advance of their adoption to verify their 
compatibility with the free movement of goods provision, whilst on the other hand national 
initiatives may serve as a potential basis for introduction of regulatory standards at 
Community level. Hence the system not only offers an intense framework of co-operation to 
improve the process of internal market building, but also could serve as a source of innovation 
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through sharing and learning.
199
 In this way, the system has been described as a device of ‘co-
operative federalism’.
200
 
 
Although it is true that over time Member States have become more active in notifying, this is 
not to say that they have been very enthusiastic about the EU disciplining their regulatory 
activities. It has indeed occurred regularly that Member States did not notify all their draft 
legislations or that they invoked the urgency exception after the adoption of the legislation in 
question. Faced with this practice, the Commission has decided for instance to remedy this 
gap by contracting an external organisation to detect national regulations which have been 
adopted in breach of the Directive.
201
 Over the years the Commission has not grown tired of 
repeating the need for stricter supervision of the notification requirement and its intention to 
initiate as a matter of course the Article 226 procedure where a failure to notify was 
identified.
202
 Case-law by the ECJ has offered the Commission a helping hand. In the early 
1990s cases concerning Italian, German and Dutch instances of non-notification, the ECJ 
confirmed that non-notification is an infringement of Community law, giving thus the 
procedure considerable more weight.
203
 In 1996, the ECJ went even further and declared that 
the failure to notify national laws under the Information Directive meant that such laws are 
unenforceable.
204
  
 
4.3. Administrative Co-operation 
 
In November 1999, the Commission observed that the Member States had made progress in 
transposing directives relating to the internal market. The percentage of directives not yet 
transposed in one or more Member States fell by half within two years and is now around the 
12% mark. The non-transposal rate for each Member State also dropped significantly: only 
five Member States still have a rate more than 5%. In its communication of 1999,205 the 
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Commission presented its ‘Strategy for the internal market’ which set out its strategic aims for 
the next five years (2000-2004): to improve the quality of life of European citizens, to 
enhance the efficiency of Community product and capital markets, to improve the business 
environment, and to exploit the achievements of the Internal Market in a changing world. A 
series of operational objectives has also been defined, with each covering a particular policy 
dimension that contributes to the achievement of one or more strategic objectives. In order to 
achieve these operational objectives, short-term priorities are identified as ‘target actions’. 
The target actions to improve the effectiveness of the legal framework include steps by the 
Member States to reduce their rate of non-transposal to less than 1.5% by the end of 2000, 
and the launch of a pilot project offering Community support for national initiatives in the 
field of administrative cooperation. This pilot project takes over from the KAROLUS 
programme for the exchange of officials, which expired at the end of 1999. The latter 
programme provided for an exchange of national officials engaged in the implementation of 
Community legislation on the internal market.206   
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
 
This chapter has analysed the main legislative provisions and practice of both the judicial and 
some alternative dispute settlement systems in the European Union. We have observed that 
there are various possibilities to review the legality of measures that are issued by the 
Community institutions: i.e. direct action (Article 230) and indirect action through the 
preliminary reference procedure of Article 234. In the last few years, the future of the 
European judicial architecture has been hotly debated. The Treaty of Nice introduced some 
significant changes. The problems due to enlargement (carrying with it also the linguistic 
problem) and the delay and the increasing caseload of the courts are still in need to be 
addressed. Some provisions of reform have been introduced by the Nice Treaty and will be 
introduced by the new Constitution. Other avenues of reform of the European judicial 
architecture, in particular relating to the preliminary reference procedure are currently being 
discussed. When studying dispute settlement in the European Union, account should be taken 
also of the alternative dispute settlement mechanisms that over the years have been developed 
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by the European Union. This article has shown that several fora have been set up that serve as 
problem-solving platforms between the Member States and the Community institutions, as 
well as aiming at the prevention of conflicts. At the same time, the Community institutions 
have also been actively promoting friendly settlements of conflicts between individuals 
(producers/traders) and Member States as well as for individuals amongst themselves 
(business and consumers).  
 
In conclusion it is submitted that the current EU model of dispute settlement does not offer 
ideal solutions but could serve as a learning process for other integration processes such as the 
Andean Community and the recently created South American Community of Nations. 
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